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that has been adopted by California and Colorado.3 This procedure differs from Raskin only in that it provides separate juries and
sometimes separate judges for the determination of the issues of
guilt and insanity. The jury that determines the insanity issue in
the second trial is free from evidence which was presented on the
issue of guilt and may without prejudice determine the defendant's
mental responsibility. The split trial procedure has been recognized by several writers as the best possible solution to the problem
which lies in the conflict between compulsory mental examinations
and the right of an accused to have a fair trial." On the other
hand, the major criticism of the split trial method is that it is too
costly and time consuming. 3 While the validity of this criticism
is unquestionable, it may well be that the split trial procedure is the
only one which meets the demands of the Constitution.
JOEL MAKEE

LICENSES - ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITY DUTY TO DISCLOSE
Fischerv. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
The common law duty of accountants has been defined in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche' as a duty flowing to those persons who rely
on the representations made by accountants. Liability of accountants has been restricted to those cases in which the accountant is
deemed to have been "grossly negligent." Recently, however, a
federal district court in Fischer v. Kletz2 suggested -that under both
the common law and the federal securities statutes accountants'
duties should be more strictly construed and their liability more liberally interpreted.
The plaintiffs in Fischer v. Kletz were present and former
owners of shares or debentures of the Yale Express System, Inc.
3

1CAi.

PEN. CODE § 1026 (West 1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-3 (1963).
-Comment, supra note 1, at 681-83; Note, supra note 1, at 102-04. The merit of
the split trial procedure is also recognized by the medical profession. Bowman, Psychiatry and CriminalResponsibility, 57 J. ME. MEDICAL ASS'N 5 (1966).
33
Note, supra note 1, at 103; Comment, supra note 1, at 681; Note, Pre-TrialMental
Examination and Commitment, 51 GEo. LJ. 143, 155-56 (1962). See generally Louisell & Hazard, lsanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial, 49 CALIF. L REV. 805

(1961).
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They brought a class action against the public accounting firm of
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (PMM), alleging that Yale's 1963
year-end financial statements prepared and certified by PMM as independent public accountants' were materially misleading because
they overstated Yale's net worth and failed to indicate a substantial
operating loss. Despite PMM's subsequent discovery of the errors
while serving as a dependent public accountant doing special accounting studies for Yale in early 1964, PMM did not reveal the
inaccuracies of the annual report until May of 1965. Moreover,
during the ensuing period PMM had acquiesced when Yale issued
misleading interim reports. Plaintiffs claimed, as a result of PMM's
silence, to have suffered as pecuniary damages the reduction in the
value of Yale securities and brought their claim relying on: (1)
common law deceit, alleging that the accounting firm knew that its
audit and certificate would be relied upon by the public, and that
PMM therefore had a continuing duty to alert the public of the material omissions; (2) section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934' (Exchange Act) on the theory that the defendants caused
a false statement or report to be filed with the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC); (3) section 10(b)5 and rule 10b-56 promulgated
under the Exchange Act for the defendant's materially misleading
statement and failure -to correct the statement in the sale of a security; and (4) rule lob-5 for defendant's act of aiding and abetting
Yale in the fraudulent sale of securities!
Typically the plaintiff alleging fraud has had to show that the
1255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Judge Cardozo held that an accountant's
"gross negligence" could result in technical or constructive fraud. If fraud is present a
right of action is open to anyone who suffered injury because he relied upon the accountant's report. Judge Cardozo, however, refused to hold the defendants liable on the
theory of negligent misrepresentation.
2 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
3 An independent public accountant owes his primary duty to the public. A dependent public accountant, on the other hand, owes his primary duty to his client in
their business relationship. During the preparation of Yale's annual report, PIM was
an independent public accountant. Following certification of the report PMM became
a dependent accountant employed by Yale to undertake special studies. The resulting
issue became whether PIM had a continuing obligation to the public, superior to the
duty it owed to its client, to report subsequently discovered information concerning the
accuracy of the annual report it had certified. Id. at 182-84.
4 15 U.S.C. S 78(r) (1964).
5 15 U.S.C. S 78(j) (1964).
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967).
7 In other litigation dealing with the same controversy, PMM had been unsuccessful
in moving to dismiss or in the alternative, for a stay of proceedings. 249 F. Supp. 539
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). Defendants likewise were unsuccessful in their objection to plaintiffs' class action. 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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defendant has made a false representation of a material fact, with
knowledge of its falsity and with intent to deceive, and with action
taken thereon and damage resulting therefrom.8 But here the alleged breach of duty confronting the court was a nondisclosere
rather than an affirmative misrepresentation. The court relied on
the theory that statements made in commercial settings are actionable if one fails to disclose to another a fact which he knows may
induce the other to act or refrain from acting. Arguing by analogy
to Loewer v. Harris,' the court concluded that the form of the representation, whether it is affirmative or a tacit nondisclosure, is not
crucial; rather, the significant factor is its impact upon the person it
induces to act. 1
Another problem facing the court was the defendant's allegation that gain by defendant, which was absent here, is a necessary
element in an action based on nondisclosure. The court indicated
that prior cases involving affirmative misrepresentations did not require proof of gain but allowed the action of deceit regardless of
the defendant's interest in the transaction. 2 The court suggested
that the requirement of intent in a deceit action 8 may be satisfied
by imputing intent: (1) when the defendant says nothing while
knowing that his representation will be relied upon by others; or
(2) if through an objective analysis, the defendant falls below an
imposed duty to disclose.'4 The effect of either is to shift to the
defendant the burden of disproving intention. The court, in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss the common law action, has
in effect suggested that PMM could be found liable for negligent
8

Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule IOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?,
57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1963).
0 266 F. Supp. at 185; see Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D.
Pa. 1964); RESTATEMENT OF TORTs §§ 551(1)-(2) (1938).
10 57 F. 368 (2d Cir. 1893), in which the defendant failed to disclose a change in
business conditions and the plaintiff relied on the defendant's original representations
to his detriment.
1266 F. Supp. at 185-86.
12 James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119 (1927) (intentional
inducement to act); Goldsmith v. Koopman, 140 F. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1905) (intentional
nondisclosure); Endsley v. Johns, 120 Ill. 469, 12 N.E. 247 (1887) (defendant's fraudulent misrepresentation of a check); Pasley v. Freeman, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (KB. 1789).
13 The requirement of proof of intent as an essential element of a deceit action was
established in Derry v. Peck, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889) and many courts still consider it
a requisite to maintaining the fraud action. See, e.g., Weber v. C.M.P. Corp., 242 F.
Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). But see, e.g., Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners,
Ltd., [1963) 3 W.L.R. 101 (suggesting that the intent requirement of Derry v. Peck
should no longer be held to control).
14 266 F. Supp. at 188-89.
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misrepresentation or deceit with the element of intent being presumed. 5
The plaintiffs also sought recovery under section 18(a) of the
Exchange Act,' 6 which imposes liability upon any person who
knowingly makes a false or misleading statement or report filed
pursuant to any rule or regulation of the Exchange Act. 1" Moreover, the section does not limit liability to any particular type of
statement or report and extends the civil remedy to any person injured by a false report. 8 Plaintiffs contended that the filing of
Yale's annual report with the SEC containing PMM's false certification was the equivalent of the filing of a false statement within
the language of the statute. The court in denying PMM's motion
to dismiss concluded that the question of whether PMM was liable
under the section would depend upon defendant's knowledge prior
to the filing of the annual report that the statements it had certified
were false. 9
Plaintiffs further argued that they were entitled to relief under
section 10b and rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. ° Rule 10b-5 extends liability to any person, who directly or indirectly: (a) employs
a scheme to defraud; (b) makes a misleading statement or material
omission which he fails to correct; or (c) engages in a fraudulent
practice in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.2"
The district court found that a civil remedy exists under rule 10b-5
15 In a recent case dealing with an action based on negligent misrepresentation,
Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), rev'd,
329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964), the appellate court noted that although the case would
have to be reversed because of a controlling Tennessee decision, Howell v. Betts, 211
Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924 (1962) which did not extend liability for negligent misrepresentation, given the proper facts, such an action could be maintained. Cf. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
16 15 U.S.C. 5 78(r) (1964).
17 Id.

18See Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Miller v. Bargain City,
U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
'9 266 F. Supp. at 189. Although the opinion of the court did not indicate the fact,
it should be noted that section 18(a) requires that the moving party must have purchased in reliance on the statement and that the statement must have caused the damage
for which relief is sought. The suggestion has been made that while the misleading
statement is likely to have an effect on the market price of the security, it is extremely
unfair to place the burden of proof on the plaintiff, and that the reliance requirement
can be established without requiring that the plaintiff have read the document complained of because of the generally recognized fact that the information filed with the
Securities Exchange is more likely to reach the plaintiff by indirect means. 3 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1753 (2d ed. 1961).
20 15 U.S.C. 5 78(j) (1964); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967).
21 17 C.F.R. 5 240.10b-5 (1967).
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for defrauded investors. 22 However, taking the plaintiffs' allegations as -true, the court faced the problem of finding a theory by
which the defendant could 'be brought within the remedial provisions of rule lOb-5.
Prior to Fischer v. Kletz, parties under rule 10b-5 had successfully maintained actions against four classes of defendants. The
first three classes consisted of insiders, broker-dealers, and corporations; common to these was the potential of economic gain resulting from fraudulent practices. The fourth category related to those
who aided and abetted the first three. 3 The problem confronting
the Fischer court was finding a theory on which liability could be
extended to an accounting firm that stood to receive no economic
advantage through its silence.'
The court argued that H, L. Green Co. v. Childree"5 and Pettit
v. American Stock Exchange 6 both supported the finding that one
who achieves no economic advantage, or remains inactive when he
has a duty to disclose, may be found liable under the section. But,
as the district court pointed out in both H. L. Green Co. and Pettit,
liability was predicated upon allegations of aiding and abetting, a
class wholly within a traditional rule 10b-5 action. The plaintiffs
in Fischer v. Kletz had made no aiding or abetting allegation in
regard to the annual report liability," and the court did not present
a compelling reason for subjecting PMM to liability under rule
10b-5. In fact, -the court simply concluded that the defendant's
motion to dismiss should be denied on the theory that the case
22 266 F. Supp. at 190; see, e.g., Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp.
33 (E.D. Pa. 1964). Contra, Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, O'Connor & Co., [19661967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,996, at 96,382 (N.D. IM. June 28,
1967) (denial of plaintiff's action on the theory that purchasers are not entitled to a
remedy under rule lOb-5).
23 266 F. Supp. at 190.
24 The court could have rationalized its denial of PMM's motion on the theory that
the fee received by the accountant to perform the audit satisfied the economic gain requirement.
25 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).

26217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
27

Plaintiffs alleged that PMM had aided and abetted Yale in the issuance of fraudulent interim reports violating section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and indicated that the action might be successful if the
plaintiffs could show at trial that the defendants had given substantial assistance or
encouragement to Yale's course of conduct. The court seemed to have no difficulty in
placing PMM in the aiding and abetting dass of rule 10b-5 defendants. 266 F. Supp.
at 189-94.
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"raises novel and difficult issues"28 important enough to require further factual and legal development.
The Fischer court could have based its decision on either of two
theories. First, if the purpose of the Exchange Act is to insure the
widest possible distribution of information about corporate affairs
for investor protection,2 9 it would be inconsistent with this purpose
to deny a remedy simply because the remedy has not been given before. Second, the opinion of Chairman Cary in Cady, Roberts &
Co.3" suggests that PMM could be included in the class of 101>5 defendants. The Chairman stated that the duty to disclose arose "first,
[from] the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party
takes advantage of such information knowing that it is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing.""1 To effectuate the purposes of
the Exchange Act, the Chairman's statement must be liberally interpreted as imposing a duty to disclose upon any individual having
access to corporate information that should be divulged to the investing public, rather than restricting the application of rule 101>5
to corporate insiders.
It is also arguable that since accountants hold themselves out
as members of a skilled profession to be relied upon by the public,
they should be responsible for their failure to maintain the highest
professional standards."
Accountants have recognized that the
opinions they express in financial statements may be relied upon by
third persons.3" Moreover, their ethical code requires disclosure of
misleading statements or material omissions in the reports they certify. 4 Breach of this duty to disclose should require the imposition
of liability as suggested by Fischer v. Kletz. However, accountants
can argue that the duty to disclose does not apply to subsequently
2

8Id. at 194.

29 The

Prospects for Rule X-10-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors,

59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950).
30 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
31 Id. at 912.
2
3 See Smith v. London Assurance Corp., 109 App. Div. 882, 96 N.Y.S. 820 (Sup.
Ct. 1905).
3

3j.

CAREY & W.

DOHERTY, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF THE AccOUNTING PRO-

(1966). "Investors, credit grantors, prospective purchasers of businesses, regulatory agencies of government, and others may rely on a CPA's opinion that financial
statements fairly reflect the financial position and results of operations of the enterprise
which he has audited." Id. at 19.
34
AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS art. 2, § 2.02.
FESSION
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discovered information, 5 and even if it did, they would not be permitted to reveal such information if they had entered into a confidential dependent relationship such as PMM did when undertaking
the special studies for Yale.36 Moreover, the effect of such a rule,
as suggested by Fischer, would be too burdensome. For example,
it could make the accountants insurers for the investing public; 7 it
could expose them to being joined as party defendants in actions
against corporations for whom they have prepared financial statements; it could encourage corporations to change independent public accountants yearly to protect themselves from accountants' disclosures; it could contribute to inaccurate financial reporting because
the accountant would not be familiar with the corporation's business
and accounting techniques; and finally, confusion and injustice could
result in the absence of a clear delineation of what was to be subsequently disclosed, how it should be disclosed, and how long the duty
to disclose should last. 8
However, to refuse to extend the civil liability of accountants
just because problems will be created is no answer. This is especially so in light of the broad provisions of the federal securities acts
which were designed to establish at least a minimum standard for
investor protection ' as well as the evolving trend of the common
law toward extending liability to those who hold themselves out to
public reliance.4" The considerations that should 'be determinative
as to whether the accountants shall be held liable are -the extent to
which their failure to disclose erroneous information in a financial
report affected the public, the .forseeabiity of harm that would result if the disclosure were not made, and the policy of preventing
35
But see 1 CPA HANDBOOK ch. 6, at 40 (R. Kane ed. 1952) (an accountant has
the duty to disclose subsequently acquired information where he knows the report he
has certified will be used in a registration statement).
3
6AICPA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs art. 1, § 1.03. The question is thus
raised as to whom the public accountant owes the primary duty, to the investors, or to
the employer. Fischer suggests it is owed to the public. See Touche, Niven, Bailey &
Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629 (1957).

87 Ultrajnares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Judge Cardozo suggested that "If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class." Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
38 266 F. Supp. at 188-89.
3

9 See Fleischer, Federal CorporationLaw: An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146

(1965).
40

See cases cited note 15 supra; W. PROSSER, TORTS § 102 (3d ed. 1964).

